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Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research
Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg
The “tragedy of the commons” metaphor helps explain why people overuse shared
resources. However, the recent proliferation of intellectual property rights in biomedical
research suggests a different tragedy, an “anticommons” in which people underuse
scarce resources because too many owners can block each other. Privatization of
biomedical research must be more carefully deployed to sustain both upstream research
and downstream product development. Otherwise, more intellectual property rights may
lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health.
Thirty years ago in Science, Garrett Hardin
introduced the metaphor “tragedy of the
commons” (1) to help explain overpopula-
tion, air pollution, and species extinction.
People often overuse resources they own in
common because they have no incentive to
conserve. Today, Hardin’s metaphor is cen-
tral to debates in economics, law, and sci-
ence and is a powerful justification for pri-
vatizing commons property (2). Although
the metaphor highlights the cost of overuse
when governments allow too many people
to use a scarce resource, it overlooks the
possibility of underuse when governments
give too many people rights to exclude oth-
ers. Privatization can solve one tragedy but
cause another (3).
Since Hardin’s article appeared, bio-
medical research has been moving from a
commons model toward a privatization
model (4). Under the commons model,
the federal government sponsored premar-
ket or “upstream” research and encouraged
broad dissemination of results in the pub-
lic domain. Unpatented biomedical dis-
coveries were freely incorporated in
“downstream” products for diagnosing and
treating disease. In 1980, in an effort to
promote commercial development of new
technologies, Congress began encouraging
universities and other institutions to
patent discoveries arising from federally
supported research and development and
to transfer their technology to the private
sector (5). Supporters applaud the result-
ing increase in patent filings and private
investment (6), whereas critics fear dete-
rioration in the culture of upstream re-
search (7). Building on Heller’s theory of
anticommons property (3), this article
identifies an unintended and paradoxical
consequence of biomedical privatization:
A proliferation of intellectual property rights
upstream may be stifling life-saving innova-
tions further downstream in the course of
research and product development.
The Tragedy of the Anticommons
Anticommons property can best be under-
stood as the mirror image of commons prop-
erty (3, 8). A resource is prone to overuse in
a tragedy of the commons when too many
owners each have a privilege to use a given
resource and no one has a right to exclude
another (9). By contrast, a resource is prone
to underuse in a “tragedy of the anticom-
mons” when multiple owners each have a
right to exclude others from a scarce re-
source and no one has an effective privilege
of use. In theory, in a world of costless
transactions, people could always avoid
commons or anticommons tragedies by
trading their rights (10). In practice, how-
ever, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming
transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and
cognitive biases of participants (11), with
success more likely within close-knit com-
munities than among hostile strangers (12–
14). Once an anticommons emerges, col-
lecting rights into usable private property is
often brutal and slow (15).
Privatization in postsocialist economies
starkly illustrates how anticommons proper-
ty can emerge and persist (3). One promise
of the transition to a free market was that
new entrepreneurs would fill stores that
socialist rule had left bare. Yet after several
years of reform, many privatized storefronts
remained empty, while flimsy metal kiosks,
stocked full of goods, mushroomed on the
streets. Why did the new merchants not
come in from the cold? One reason was that
transition governments often failed to en-
dow any individual with a bundle of rights
that represents full ownership. Instead, frag-
mented rights were distributed to various
socialist-era stakeholders, including private
or quasi-private enterprises, workers’ collec-
tives, privatization agencies, and local, re-
gional, and federal governments. No one
could set up shop without first collecting
rights from each of the other owners.
Privatization of upstream biomedical re-
search in the United States may create
anticommons property that is less visible
than empty storefronts but even more eco-
nomically and socially costly. In this set-
ting, privatization takes the form of intel-
lectual property claims to the sorts of re-
search results that, in an earlier era, would
have been made freely available in the pub-
lic domain. Responding to a shift in U.S.
government policy (4) in the past two de-
cades, research institutions such as the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) and major
universities have created technology trans-
fer offices to patent and license their dis-
coveries. At the same time, commercial
biotechnology firms have emerged in re-
search and development (R&D) niches
somewhere between the proverbial “funda-
mental” research of academic laboratories
and the targeted product development of
pharmaceutical firms (7). Today, upstream
research in the biomedical sciences is in-
creasingly likely to be “private” in one or
more senses of the term—supported by pri-
vate funds, carried out in a private institu-
tion, or privately appropriated through pat-
ents, trade secrecy, or agreements that re-
strict the use of materials and data.
In biomedical research, as in postsocial-
ist transition, privatization holds both
promises and risks. Patents and other forms
of intellectual property protection for up-
stream discoveries may fortify incentives to
undertake risky research projects and could
result in a more equitable distribution of
profits across all stages of R&D. But privat-
ization can go astray when too many owners
hold rights in previous discoveries that con-
stitute obstacles to future research (16).
Upstream patent rights, initially offered to
help attract further private investment, are
increasingly regarded as entitlements by
those who do research with public funds. A
researcher who may have felt entitled to
coauthorship or a citation in an earlier era
may now feel entitled to be a coinventor on
a patent or to receive a royalty under a
material transfer agreement. The result has
been a spiral of overlapping patent claims in
the hands of different owners, reaching ever
further upstream in the course of biomedi-
cal research. Researchers and their institu-
tions may resent restrictions on access to
the patented discoveries of others, yet no-
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body wants to be the last one left dedicating
findings to the public domain.
The problem we identify is distinct from
the routine underuse inherent in any well-
functioning patent system. By conferring
monopolies in discoveries, patents necessar-
ily increase prices and restrict use—a cost
society pays to motivate invention and dis-
closure. The tragedy of the anticommons
refers to the more complex obstacles that
arise when a user needs access to multiple
patented inputs to create a single useful
product. Each upstream patent allows its
owner to set up another tollbooth on the
road to product development, adding to the
cost and slowing the pace of downstream
biomedical innovation.
How a Biomedical Anticommons
May Arise
Current examples in biomedical research
demonstrate two mechanisms by which a
government might inadvertently create an
anticommons: either by creating too many
concurrent fragments of intellectual proper-
ty rights in potential future products or by
permitting too many upstream patent own-
ers to stack licenses on top of the future
discoveries of downstream users.
Concurrent fragments. The anticom-
mons model provides one way of under-
standing a widespread intuition that issuing
patents on gene fragments makes little
sense. Throughout the 1980s, patents on
genes generally corresponded closely to
foreseeable commercial products, such as
therapeutic proteins or diagnostic tests for
recognized genetic diseases (17). Then, in
1991, NIH pointed the way toward patent-
ing anonymous gene fragments with its no-
torious patent applications on expressed se-
quence tags (ESTs) (18). NIH subsequently
abandoned these patent applications and
now takes a more hostile position toward
patenting ESTs and raw genomic DNA se-
quences (19). Meanwhile, private firms
have stepped in where NIH left off, filing
patent applications on newly identified
DNA sequences, including gene fragments,
before identifying a corresponding gene,
protein, biological function, or potential
commercial product. The Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), in examining
these claims (20), could create or avoid an
anticommons.
Although a database of gene fragments is
a useful resource for discovery, defining
property rights around isolated gene frag-
ments seems at the outset unlikely to track
socially useful bundles of property rights in
future commercial products. Foreseeable
commercial products, such as therapeutic
proteins or genetic diagnostic tests, are
more likely to require the use of multiple
fragments. A proliferation of patents on
individual fragments held by different own-
ers seems inevitably to require costly future
transactions to bundle licenses together be-
fore a firm can have an effective right to
develop these products (21).
Patents on receptors useful for screening
potential pharmaceutical products demon-
strate another potential “concurrent frag-
ment” anticommons in biomedical re-
search. To learn as much as possible about
the therapeutic effects and side effects of
potential products at the preclinical stage,
firms want to screen products against all
known members of relevant receptor fami-
lies. But if these receptors are patented and
controlled by different owners, gathering
the necessary licenses may be difficult or
impossible. A recent search of the Lexis
patent database disclosed more than 100
issued U.S. patents with the term “adrener-
gic receptor” in the claim language. Such a
proliferation of claims presents a daunting
bargaining challenge. Unable to procure a
complete set of licenses, firms choose be-
tween diverting resources to less promising
projects with fewer licensing obstacles or
proceeding to animal and then clinical test-
ing on the basis of incomplete information.
More thorough in vitro screening could
avoid premature clinical testing that ex-
poses patients to unnecessary risks.
Long delays between the filing and is-
suance of biotechnology patents aggravate
the problem of concurrent fragments. Dur-
ing this period of pendency, there is sub-
stantial uncertainty as to the scope of
patent rights that will ultimately issue.
Although U.S. patent law does not recog-
nize enforceable rights in pending patent
applications, firms and universities typi-
cally enter into license agreements before
the issuance of patents, and firms raise
capital on the basis of the inchoate rights
preserved by patent filings. In effect, each
potential patent creates a specter of rights
that may be larger than the actual rights, if
any, eventually conferred by the PTO.
Worked into the calculations of both risk-
taking investors and risk-averse product
developers, these overlapping patent fil-
ings may compound the obstacles to de-
veloping new products.
Stacking licenses. The use of reach-
through license agreements
(RTLAs) on patented research
tools illustrates another path by which an
anticommons may emerge. As we use the
term, an RTLA gives the owner of a patent-
ed invention, used in upstream stages of
research, rights in subsequent downstream
discoveries. Such rights may take the form of
a royalty on sales that result from use of the
upstream research tool, an exclusive or non-
exclusive license on future discoveries, or an
option to acquire such a license. In principle,
RTLAs offer advantages to both patent
holders and researchers. They permit re-
searchers with limited funds to use patented
research tools right away and defer payment
until the research yields valuable results.
Patent holders may also prefer a chance at
larger payoffs from sales of downstream prod-
ucts rather than certain, but smaller, upfront
fees. In practice, RTLAs may lead to an
anticommons as upstream owners stack over-
lapping and inconsistent claims on potential
downstream products. In effect, the use of
RTLAs gives each upstream patent owner a
continuing right to be present at the bargain-
ing table as a research project moves down-
stream toward product development.
So far, RTLAs have had a mixed recep-
tion as a mechanism for licensing upstream
biomedical research patents, but they appear
to be becoming more prevalent. When Cetus
Corporation initially proposed RTLAs on
any products developed through the use of
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in re-
search, they met strong resistance from
downstream users concerned with developing
commercial products (22). Later, Hoffmann–
La Roche acquired the rights to PCR and
offered licenses that do not include reach-
through obligations (23). The resulting pay-
as-you-go approach increases the upfront cost
of a license to use PCR, but it decreases the
likelihood of an anticommons emerging.
More recently, some universities and
other nonprofit research institutions have
balked at terms DuPont Corporation has
offered for licenses to use patented onco-
mouse (24) and cre-lox (25) technologies,
although others have acquiesced to the li-
cense terms (26). These patents cover ge-
netically engineered mice useful in research
that could result in products falling outside
the scope of the patent claims. DuPont has
offered noncommercial research licenses
and sublicenses on terms that seem to re-
quire licensees to return to DuPont for fur-
ther approval before any new discoveries or
materials resulting from the use of licensed
mice are passed along to others or used for
commercial purposes (27). DuPont thereby
gains the right to participate in future ne-
gotiations to develop commercial products
that fall outside the scope of their patent
claims. In effect, the license terms permit
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DuPont to leverage its proprietary position
in upstream research tools into a broad veto
right over downstream research and product
development.
As RTLAs to use patented research
tools multiply, researchers will face in-
creasing difficulties conveying clear title
to firms that might develop future discov-
eries. If a particularly valuable commercial
product is in view, downstream product
developers might be motivated and able to
reach agreements with multiple holders of
RTLAs. But if the prospects for success are
more uncertain or the expected commer-
cial value is small, the parties may fail to
bargain past the anticommons.
Transition or Tragedy?
Is a biomedical anticommons likely to en-
dure once it emerges? Recent empirical lit-
erature suggests that communities of intel-
lectual property owners who deal with each
other on a recurring basis have sometimes
developed institutions to reduce transaction
costs of bundling multiple licenses (28). For
example, in the music industry, copyright
collectives have evolved to facilitate licens-
ing transactions so that broadcasters and
other producers may readily obtain permis-
sion to use numerous copyrighted works
held by different owners. Similarly, in the
automobile, aircraft manufacturing, and
synthetic rubber industries, patent pools
have emerged, sometimes with the help of
government, when licenses under multiple
patent rights have been necessary to devel-
op important new products (28). When the
background legal rules threaten to waste
resources, people often rearrange rights sen-
sibly and create order through private ar-
rangements (12–14). Perhaps some of the
problems caused by proliferating upstream
patent rights in biomedical research will
recede as licensors and licensees gain expe-
rience with intellectual property rights and
institutions evolve to help owners and users
reach agreements. The short-term costs
from delayed development of new treat-
ments for disease may be worth incurring if
fragmented privatization allows upstream
research to pay its own way and helps to
ensure its long-run viability. Patent barriers
to product development may be a transi-
tional phenomenon rather than an endur-
ing tragedy.
On the other hand, there may be reasons
to fear that a patent anticommons could
prove more intractable in biomedical re-
search than in other settings. Because pat-
ents matter more to the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries than to other in-
dustries, firms in these industries may be
less willing to participate in patent pools
that undermine the gains from exclusivity
(29). Moreover, the lack of substitutes for
certain biomedical discoveries (such as pat-
ented genes or receptors) may increase the
leverage of some patent holders, thereby
aggravating holdout problems. Rivals may
not be able to invent around patents in
research aimed at understanding the genet-
ic bases of diseases as they occur in nature.
More generally, three structural con-
cerns caution against uncritical reliance on
markets and norms to avoid a biomedical
anticommons tragedy: the transaction costs
of rearranging entitlements, heterogeneous
interests of owners, and cognitive biases
among researchers.
Transaction costs of bundling rights.
High transaction costs may be an enduring
impediment to efficient bundling of intel-
lectual property rights in biomedical re-
search. First, many upstream patent owners
are public institutions with limited resourc-
es for absorbing transaction costs and lim-
ited competence in fast-paced, market-ori-
ented bargaining. Second, the rights in-
volved cover a diverse set of techniques,
reagents, DNA sequences, and instruments.
Difficulties in comparing the values of these
patents will likely impede development of a
standard distribution scheme. Third, the
heterogeneity of interests and resources
among public and private patent owners
may complicate the emergence of standard
license terms, requiring costly case-by-case
negotiations. Fourth, licensing transaction
costs are likely to arise early in the course of
R&D when the outcome of a project is
uncertain, the potential gains are specula-
tive, and it is not yet clear that the value of
downstream products justifies the trouble of
overcoming the anticommons.
Even when upstream owners see poten-
tial gains from cooperation and are moti-
vated to devise mechanisms for reducing
transaction costs, they may be deterred by
other legal constraints, such as antitrust
laws. Patent pools have been a target of
antitrust scrutiny in the past (30), which
may explain why few, if any, such pools
exist today. Although antitrust law may be
less hostile to patent pools today than it was
in 1975 when a consent decree dismantled
the aircraft patent pool (31), the antitrust
climate changes from one administration to
the next (32). Even a remote prospect of
facing treble damages and an injunction
may give firms pause about entering into
such agreements.
Heterogeneous interests of rights hold-
ers. Intellectual property rights in upstream
biomedical research belong to a large, di-
verse group of owners in the public and
private sectors with divergent institutional
agendas. Sometimes heterogeneity of inter-
ests can facilitate mutually agreeable allo-
cations (you take the credit, I’ll take the
money) (33, 34), but in this setting, there
are reasons to fear that owners will have
conflicting agendas that make it difficult to
reach agreement. For example, a politically
accountable government agency such as
NIH may further its public health mission
by using its intellectual property rights to
ensure widespread availability of new ther-
apeutic products at reasonable prices. When
NIH sought to establish its co-ownership of
patent rights held by Burroughs-Wellcome
on the use of azidothymidine (AZT) to
treat the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) (35), its purpose was to lower the
price of AZT and promote public health
rather than simply to maximize its financial
return. By contrast, a private firm is more
likely to use intellectual property to main-
tain a lucrative product monopoly that re-
wards shareholders and funds future product
development. When owners have conflict-
ing goals and each can deploy its rights to
block the strategies of the others, they may
not be able to reach an agreement that
leaves enough private value for downstream
developers to bring products to the market.
A more subtle conflict in agendas arises
between owners that pursue end-product de-
velopment and those that focus primarily on
upstream research. The goal of end-product
development may be better served by mak-
ing patented research tools widely available
on a nonexclusive basis, whereas the goal of
procuring upstream research funding may be
better served by offering exclusive licenses to
sponsors or research partners. Differences
among patent owners in their tolerance for
transaction costs may further complicate the
emergence of informal licensing norms. Uni-
versities may be ill equipped to handle mul-
tiple transactions for acquiring licenses to
use research tools. Delays in negotiating
multiple agreements to use patented process-
es, reagents, and gene fragments could stifle
the creative give-and-take of academic re-
search. Yet academic researchers who fail to
adopt new discoveries and instead rely on
obsolete public domain technologies may
find themselves losing grant competitions.
Large corporations with substantial legal de-
partments may have considerably greater re-
sources for negotiating licenses on a case-by-
case basis than public sector institutions or
small start-up firms. This asymmetry may
make it difficult to identify mutually advan-
tageous cross-licensing arrangements. Patent
owners are also likely to differ in the time
frames they can tolerate for recouping cur-
rent investments in transaction costs.
Owners are also likely to differ in their
willingness and ability to infringe the pat-
ents of others, resulting in asymmetrical
motivations to negotiate cross-licenses. Use
of a patented invention in an academic
laboratory or a small start-up firm may be
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inconspicuous, at least if not described in
a publication or at a scientific meeting.
Patent owners may be more reluctant to sue
public sector investigators than they are to
sue private firms. Differences in institution-
al cultures may make academic laboratories
and biotechnology firms more tolerant of
patent infringement than large pharmaceu-
tical firms. Owners who do not feel vulner-
able to infringement liability may be less
motivated to enter into reasonable cross-
licenses than owners who worry more about
being sued.
Cognitive biases. People consistently
overestimate the likelihood that very low
probability events of high salience will oc-
cur (36). For example, many travelers over-
estimate the danger of an airplane crash
relative to the hazards of other modes of
transportation. We suspect that a similar
bias is likely to cause owners of upstream
biomedical research patents to overvalue
their discoveries. Imagine that one of a set
of 50 upstream inventions will likely be the
key to identifying an important new drug,
the rest of the set will have no practical use,
and a downstream product developer is will-
ing to pay $10 million for the set. Given the
assumption that no owner knows ex ante
which invention will be the key, a rational
owner should be willing to sell her patent
for the probabilistic value of $200,000.
However, if each owner overestimates the
likelihood that her patent will be the key,
then each will demand more than the prob-
abilistic value, the upstream owners collec-
tively will demand more than the aggregate
market value of their inputs, the down-
stream user will decline the offers, and the
new drug will not be developed. Individuals
trained in deterministic rather than proba-
bilistic disciplines are particularly likely to
succumb to this sort of error (37).
A related “attribution bias” suggests that
people systematically overvalue their assets
and disparage the claims of their opponents
when in competition with others (38). We
suspect that the attribution bias is pervasive
among scientists because it is likely adap-
tive for the research enterprise as a whole.
Overcommitment by individuals to partic-
ular research approaches ensures that no
hypothesis is dismissed too quickly, and
skepticism toward rivals’ claims ensures that
they are not too readily accepted. But this
bias can interfere with clear-headed bar-
gaining, leading owners to overvalue their
own patents, undervalue others’ patents,
and reject reasonable offers. Institutional
ownership could mitigate these biases, but
technology transfer offices rely on scientists
to evaluate their discoveries. When two or
more patent owners each hope to dominate
the product market, the history of biotech-
nology patent litigation suggests a likeli-
hood that bargaining will fail (39).
Conclusion
Like the transition to free markets in post-
socialist economies, the privatization of bio-
medical research offers both promises and
risks. It promises to spur private investment
but risks creating a tragedy of the anticom-
mons through a proliferation of fragmented
and overlapping intellectual property rights.
An anticommons in biomedical research
may be more likely to endure than in other
areas of intellectual property because of the
high transaction costs of bargaining, heter-
ogeneous interests among owners, and cog-
nitive biases of researchers. Privatization
must be more carefully deployed if it is to
serve the public goals of biomedical re-
search. Policy-makers should seek to ensure
coherent boundaries of upstream patents
and to minimize restrictive licensing prac-
tices that interfere with downstream prod-
uct development. Otherwise, more up-
stream rights may lead paradoxically to few-
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